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Abstract
UK transport policy is entering arguably its most challenging period. The 12 years since 1997 
has seen record levels of investment in local and national transport systems. There have 
been notable policy innovations such as the London Congestion Charge and requirements 
for nationwide School Travel Plans. There have been some successful policy outcomes such 
as increased rail patronage, serious accident reductions and improved air quality in many 
places and yet the problems of congestion, climate change, inclusion, obesity and equality 
are more severe now than at any previous time. The period from 2010 will be characterised 
by significant and sustained cuts in public expenditure and transport cannot expect to 
escape from these. It follows that business as usual is not actually an option - so, what are 
the policy options for transport which parties seeking to govern need to consider?
This paper is a think piece developed through collaboration between academics across a 
range of policy areas including governance, behavioural and social trends, energy and the 
environment, social equity and equal opportunities, public acceptability and freight. The 
paper sets out an analysis of the problems using the Driving Forces, State, Response 
framework. The Response comprises an assessment of five policies which should be 
started, five which should be stopped and four which should be applied more intensively. 
The selections demonstrate both strengths and weaknesses in the current policy set and 
suggest the need for a much broader debate about where next if the next decade is not to be 
a cut-price ‘business as usual’ approach which takes the UK further away from a sustainable 
transport system.
1. Introduction
The next General Election is due by May 2010. Whilst it seems highly fanciful to suggest that 
transport will grab more than a few minutes headlines on the campaign trail the next 
government is going to be faced with some very difficult policy choices within transport on 
taking power. This paper is intended to spark debate about the nature of the transport policy 
problem which future governments will face. It is organised using a Driving Forces, State, 
Response framework similar to that adopted by the UN Commission on Sustainable 
Development. Section 2 (Driving Forces) looks at the underlying drivers of demand for travel 
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and how these are incorporated in policy making. Section 3 (State) considers the 
comparative importance of key policy objectives and discusses how these have changed 
over the previous decade. The next three sections (Response) present a series of short 
analyses of transport policies which, in the light of the analysis in Sections 2 and 3 the 
authors feel should be stopped (Section 4), started (Section 5) and applied more intensively 
(Section 6). Some conclusions are drawn in Section 7.
2. Driving Forces
The DfT makes use of its National Transport Model (NTM) to forecast future levels of traffic. 
It notes that “key drivers of traffic growth in the NTM are changes in income, employment, 
population and travel costs” (DfT, 2008a). Current mid-range forecasts are that traffic will be 
31% higher in 2025 and car ownership 33% higher/capita than in 2003. Similar drivers 
support the future forecast growth in aviation (Pearce, 2008). Forecasting does acknowledge 
some uncertainty through employment of sensitivity analysis which adjusts inputs to the 
modelling to produce ‘high’ and ‘low’ (and indeed now ‘low low’) forecasts around a central 
forecast thus creating a ‘forecast fan’. However, such a fan rather implies a certainty that the 
emergent trend in traffic will reside within that range. Bayliss et al. (2008) identify that actual 
traffic levels (up to 2006) have been well below the mid-range forecasts provided by both the 
1989 and 1997 National Road Traffic Forecasts. Of course, these driving forces are both 
evidence based and important (and if we believe current population projections – potentially 
critical) but how certain can we be that these historic relationships will hold true in future 
decades? Traffic growth is already decoupling from economic growth (DfT, 2006) but how far 
might this go? What impact will continuing volatility in the oil market have on lifestyle 
choices? Will future generations cease to see congestion as the major economic drain that it 
is conceptualised as today (Goodwin and Lyons, 2009)?
An alternative approach to inform policymaking decisions is scenario planning. The Foresight 
Programme recently examined transport and employed scenario planning to project into the 
future. Two ‘axes of uncertainty’ (acceptance of or resistance to the role of technology (social 
attitudes) and high through to low impact transport) framed the creation of a set of four 
scenarios depicting very different futures (OST, 2006). The scenario planning exercise was 
not intended to allow the emergence of a single vision for the future but rather to challenge 
policymakers to consider how to formulate policies that can be robust in the face of such 
future uncertainty and thus positively contribute to society’s evolution.
While the NTM forecasting and the scenario planning exercise are serving somewhat 
different purposes, it is perhaps significant that the key ‘driving forces’ in the two approaches 
are rather different. In the case of the latter notably social attitudes are seen as influential in 
shaping society’s engagement with technological opportunities in the face of environmental 
impacts that will likely force a direction of response from policymakers and society. The NTM 
forecasting rather implies societal developments of significance to transport are ‘external’ to 
policy. Meanwhile, the scenario planning, we would advocate, underlines the role that policy 
can play in working with attitudes, opportunities and impacts to exert positive influence on 
the type of society that is developing and the nature of the transport system that thus co-
evolves with it.
The information age is unfolding around us far more rapidly than the motor age did before it. 
Consider that the Google.com web domain was only registered in 1997. Only a few years 
earlier commentators had said “there is no natural way for grocery teleshopping to evolve 
alongside superstore retailing” (Hepworth and Ducatel, 1992) and yet today online grocery 
shopping is very much making its presence felt. In 1998 only 9% of households had access 
to the Internet. By 2007 61% had Internet access with 52% having broadband access. We 
have passed the point where there are more mobile phones than people in the UK. 
According to idc.com 84 billion emails/day were being sent globally in 2006 (33 billion being 
spam) up from 10 billion in 2000. We suggest that a major driving force for the future is that 
information and communications technologies (ICTs) are weakening the temporal and spatial 
fixity of participation in activities. Since much if not all travel is derived from such 
participation, then it follows that ICTs will impact on travel. ICTs can impact upon travel in a 
variety of ways including substituting for trips taking place, stimulating more trips taking place 
and enriching the experience of travel itself through travel time use. ICTs allow us to do 
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things differently. What is uncertain is how such opportunity permeates into society and 
everyday social practices to redefine norms of behaviour. The question for policymakers is 
whether they should be inactive, reactive or proactive in policy response.
Crucial to our beliefs about how to plan for the future is the relationship between 
technological fix and behaviour change – a significant ‘axis of uncertainty’. Whilst the recent 
King Review and Low Carbon strategy (DfT, 2009a) have a strong emphasis on 
technological fixes relative to behaviour change we suggest that such a view is at least worth
challenging.   Technology fixes have a long development period and often appear to remain 
elusively ‘only 5-10 years away’; meanwhile behaviour change is a strong natural force 
running through society and individuals as they move through the life course (e.g. changing 
locations of employment and residence) - with appropriate and sufficiently robust policy 
levers this behaviour change could be positively influenced for some immediately and 
substantially. Even if an engine and clean energy revolution were to solve climate emissions 
from transport such a revolution would do nothing for the congestion, safety or social 
inclusion agendas. There is much to be understood about the attitudes of the public both in 
their relationship to behaviour (and can potentially govern how individuals act and indeed 
how they respond to policy) and how they act as a constraint on policy formulation if the right 
balance is to be struck.
Our main conclusion on driving forces is not to throw away that which we have learnt from 
previous decades about the importance of price, quality and income. It is instead to ask the 
next governments to consider the extent to which these assumptions might change as 
attitudes, technologies and external factors change and to consider whether planning for a 
continuation of these trends is consistent with the longer-term goals of policy. The next 
section presents a case for change based on an assessment of the current policy challenges 
and the impotence of recent policies in tackling most of these.
3. State
Review upon review of national policy continues to draw out the same key issues which 
define the pressures on the transport system. Delivering a Sustainable Transport System 
highlights these as supporting national economic competitiveness and growth, by delivering 
reliable and efficient transport networks; reducing transport’s emissions of carbon dioxide 
and other greenhouse gases; better safety, security and health; greater equality of 
opportunity; improved quality of life and a healthier natural environment (DfT, 2008b, p7).
These issues must be considered within the context of the recession which has created a 
particularly intense set of fiscal pressures on the transport sector which the next two 
governments will need to manage. The Treasury forecasts that the overall impact of the 
recession will be increases in GDP some 9% lower than it would otherwise have been by 
2011. This has two important impacts for transport. First, traffic levels are still below their 
2007 peak with HGV traffic at its lowest level since 2003 (DfT, 2009b). As would be 
anticipated, this drop in traffic has contributed to improvements in reliability on the inter-
urban road network and lower congestion levels in the largest urban areas (albeit small). 
Whilst it is anticipated that traffic levels will recover it has, nonetheless, removed some 
pressures on short-term congestion mitigation. The second impact will be on future budgets 
as public expenditure is cut back following the fiscal stimulus. Budget 2009 assumes that net 
public investment falls from 3.1% of GDP in 2009/10 to 2.5% in 2010/11 to 1.25% in 2013/14
(HM Treasury, 2009). There will be particular pressures on capital spending within 
Government Departments and this is a particular concern for DfT which, at 55%, has a much 
higher than average (13%) proportion of capital spend. 
It seems inevitable that there will be real cuts in spending in transport under any future 
spending scenario (IFS, 2009). How severe these cuts are depends on political priorities for 
protecting spend in other areas but it is not unrealistic to assume that there could be cuts in 
capital expenditure of up to 20% and revenue funding of half of this. Other sources of income 
used to support local transport including revenue support from the Department of 
Communities and Local Government and Council Tax. According to the Local Government 
Association (2009) local authorities have experienced a £4bn deficit in income over the last 
two years. Two reasons put forward for the deficit have been the downturn in the property 
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market and low interest rates, since this has impacted on the return on their cash deposits.
Fees from parking and income from planning obligations have also fallen and so the 
demands placed on local transport budgets will tighten further. Spending on transport may 
be similar to levels prior to the 10 Year Plan for Transport.
This will pose further challenges to the equality and inclusion agenda as lower income 
groups are far more reliant on locally subsidised public transport than higher income groups. 
Whilst some public transport corridors into major cities continue to perform well, there are 
increasing requirements for subsidy to protect evening and weekend services and services 
to estates and more rural settings. The revenue pressures on local authorities challenge the 
maintenance of even the current networks.
Whilst road traffic accidents have long been recognised as a major health issue (and one 
which costs the economy around £15bn a year) this is being overtaken by obesity as a 
serious and growing health risk. The NHS states that “Obesity is one of the biggest health 
challenges we face… Almost 1 in 4 adults in England are currently obese, and if we carry on 
as we are by 2050, 9 in 10 adults will be overweight or obese. The cost of overweight and 
obese individuals to the NHS is estimated to be £4.2 billion and is forecasted to more than 
double by 2050. The cost to the wider economy is £16 billion, and this is predicted to rise to 
£50 billion per year by 2050 if left unchecked.” (HM Government, 2009a). Whilst obesity is a 
complex and multi-faceted problem to tackle, building physical activity into lifestyles is seen 
as a key part of the agenda putting greater emphasis on initiatives to promote active travel 
and to provide accessibility to key leisure and sporting opportunities.
In recent years, climate change has been variously described as the greatest challenge and 
highest priority facing the Government. This cannot yet be said to have led to transformative 
policy initiatives in the transport or any other sectors which do justice to the scientific 
consensus on the scale and urgency of the problem. Until very recently, projections of 
carbon from transport have merely demonstrated a stabilisation of emissions towards 2020, 
rather than contributing to overall targets (DfT 2008c). However, the Climate Change Act of 
2008 has introduced carbon budgets which set limits on the total greenhouse gas emissions 
allowed from the UK in successive five year periods. This requires a 34% cut on 1990 levels 
by 2020 setting the trajectory to an 80% reduction by 2050. These targets cannot be met in 
the medium or long term without the transport sector pulling its weight. 
In line with these targets, the Government is now piloting a system of individual 
Departmental budgets. The DfT is responsible for 18% of the carbon budget to be achieved 
in 2018-22 or, ‘the equivalent to around 4 million people choosing to cycle five miles to work 
instead of taking the car’ (HM Government 2009b). However, the twin pressures of carbon 
reduction and the pursuit of energy resilience have galvanised a new conventional wisdom 
for the ‘dash to electricity’ (Anable et al. 2009). The pressure is on to accelerate the uptake 
of electric vehicles and associated infrastructure facilitated by massive (decarbonised) 
electrification of our energy system. There are, however, multiple pathways to a lower 
carbon economy and the key trade off will be the speed with which travel demand could be 
reduced versus the decarbonisation of the energy supply. Evidence suggests that reducing 
travel demand may be a more cost effective way to reduce carbon whilst at the same time 
limiting exposure to energy shocks and the uncertainties involved in technological 
development (Ibid.).
The rush to a low carbon vehicle future has an important side-effect which will need to be 
addressed over the next decade. Currently vehicle tax revenue is obtained from what Potter 
and Parkhurst (2005) label as the “three crucial points in the life-cycle use of cars”, namely 
the initial purchase of a vehicle, tax on ownership, through the annual registration tax and 
the tax on the use of vehicles, in the form of fuel and parking charges. This life cycle 
however is likely to be unsustainable since as stated by the Committee on Climate Change 
(2008) there is likely to be reduced fuel duty revenue as a result of improved fuel efficiency in 
the order of £2.5bn. In addition, the Committee expect there to be a reduction in VED 
revenue as a result of a change in behaviour with respect to buying a car. Over time they 
foresee the introduction of new technologies, most notably electric vehicles and plug-in 
hybrids, and a move to buying medium rather than large cars, leading to a £1.5bn reduction 
in VED. 
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A further pressure which is emerging is that of public acceptability. Almost a decade on from 
the Fuel Duty Protests the high price of oil and high levels of fuel duty in the UK continue to 
provide a tense backdrop against which to promote changes in transport taxation. Whilst 
changes in VED to an emissions-based system were uncontroversial, recent amendments 
which penalised the owners of older vehicles (and therefore generally lower income car 
owners) were received with outcry and ultimately modified. Whilst London and Stockholm 
stand out as two success stories for congestion charging Edinburgh and, more recently 
Manchester have received resounding ‘no’ votes on their proposed schemes, the latter in 
spite of a multi-billion pound proposed investment package. Part of this tension is borne out 
of the fact that motorists already pay more in tax than is spent on transport (HoC, 2009). 
Work by Bonsall et al. (2004) suggests that the public also see different, more local, priorities 
to those discussed above. The longer-term and higher level agendas do not necessarily 
match with the priorities of the majority of road users. Delivering a more radical change 
agenda will require a much better understanding of how to engage the public with the 
various behaviour change initiatives which may be required.
In the light of these key pressures it is instructive to review the state of the transport system 
using some headline metrics and to consider how much it has changed in the past decade. 
One purpose of the analysis is to provide a reality check on how much change has been 
achieved given the large increases in expenditure on transport over this period. The key 
findings are presented in Table 1. The table includes the authors’ own assessment of the 
direction of change using a simple traffic light system, whether this change is likely to reduce 
(green) or increase (red) the pressures described above (amber being neutral). Such an 
analysis has some important caveats. First, the money (around £12-£13bn/year) could have 
been spent differently and to better effect (see Docherty and Shaw, 2009 for a detailed 
critique of this). Secondly, some indicators (e.g. growth in car traffic) have benefits and 
disbenefits to different objectives and so the scoring is an overall assessment rather than a 
definitive statement that there is nothing positive about such trends. Finally, the past is not 
necessarily a guide to the future as new technologies and policies are adopted. Nonetheless, 
given the more restricted financial realities for future governments it indicates the nature of 
the challenge.  
The analysis suggests that the past decade has been a decade of drift in UK transport policy 
(see also Docherty and Shaw, 2009). Notable achievements have been made such as the 
improvements to road safety, the introduction of congestion charging in London, the uptake 
of School and Workplace Travel plans and reforms to company car taxation and Vehicle 
Excise Duty (which are more in line with the polluter pays principle). The historic backlog of 
underinvestment in the maintenance of road and rail assets has been tackled – although the 
scale of this challenge has been illuminating.
Whilst significant increases have been achieved in rail passenger numbers this has been at 
significant cost to the fare and the tax payer. Bus journeys in London have also risen with 
additional subsidy and the decline in some areas outside London appears to have slowed, 
halted or in some case reversed – although again at some cost to the public purse. The 
future still promises a fall in the real-terms costs of motoring against rises in the real terms 
cost of public transport (due in part to rising staff, pension and health and safety costs but 
also as the government set out to reduce its % subsidy of the rail industry to 25%).
In the light of the financial cut backs which are anticipated, we predict that a business as 
usual projection of transport policy will lead to reduced capital expenditure programmes, 
reduced subsidy for public transport and cutbacks in routine maintenance (potentially 
undoing many of the gains of the past decade). The gap between the costs of private 
motoring and public transport will rise yet further with associated negative impacts on equity. 
Equally, traffic growth will resume, albeit at lower levels than anticipated in current forecasts 
and congestion will creep back above the recent peak of 2007. There will be a more limited 
scope to invest in capacity enhancement and this will lead to the growth in congestion pinch 
points around the network, particularly towards the latter part of the decade. Equally, 
investment in major public realm projects will be threatened due to the difficulty of identifying 
the precise nature of their benefits.
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Table 1: Changes in UK Transport System 1998-2008
Indicator Units 1998 2008 Change Comment
Car Traffic Bn veh-km 370.6 404.1a Ï But rate of growth slowed.
LGV and HGV traffic Bn veh-km 78.5 97.6a Ï Main growth in LGV class
Local Bus (exc. London) Millions 3149 3074 ~ Boosted by concessionary fares
Local Bus (London) Millions 1281 2090 Ï Frequency, fares and congestion 
charge
Rail Journeys Bn-pass-km 34.7 46.2 Ï Growth not forecast at privatisation
Walking Trips/personb 292 245 Ð Av. trip distance approx. constant
Cycling Trips/personb 18 14 Ð Stabilised with some increases
CO2 emissions road MtCO2 116.0 121.6a Ï HGVs and vans (cars stable)
CO2 emissions non-road MtCO2 7.3 9.7a Ï Excludes international aviation
Air Quality
Authorities 
with AQMA
? 235 ~
Reductions in toxic emissions but 
traffic based exceedences remain 
Killed & Seriously Injured 000s 44.2 28.6 Ð Continued success of road safety 
strategy
All casualties 000s 325.2 230.9 Ð
Condition of road 
network
Defectsc - - Ð Strongly related to investment 
levels
Motor Vehicles Licensed Million 27.0 34.0 Ï Utilisation rate dropped
Cars under 1200cc % 18.2 11.6 Ð Upsizing of purchases offsets 
some of efficiency gains
Cars over 2000cc % 8.5 13.7 Ï
Rail Costs (05/06 prices) £Bn 7 12 Ï
Rail farebox proportion % 65 49 Ð Difficult to sustain
Bus Subsidyd (07prices) £M 812 1994 Ï Pressure grows as car use rises
Income VED £Bn 4.5 5.2 Ï
Income Fuel Duty £Bn 19 23.2 Ï
a figures are last confirmed figures from 2007
b figures are changes 1995-97 to 2005
c changes in measurement approaches make summarising difficult but this applies across all road categories
d Concessionary fare support and local subsidy only
The current low carbon transport strategy forecasts that technological improvements, 
taxation reforms and developments in renewable fuels will lead to cuts in carbon emissions 
with reductions of around 10% achievable over the coming decade. It remains to be seen 
whether the financial capital and consumer appetite for new technology vehicles will emerge 
in the fragile economic recovery period and whether these gains will therefore be achieved. 
We nonetheless consider them to be worthwhile if cautious in their nature.
In summary, business as usual will produce 10 years of managed decline in the quality and
level of service of our major infrastructures. The transport system will become more car 
dominated and is likely to hold greater inequities to those remaining reliant on the public 
transport system. Whilst transport’s contribution to atmospheric emissions will reduce 
marginally, this will not produce any noticeable improvement to quality of life, nor will it help 
to promote more active lifestyles. Although this presents a bleak picture we do not see this 
outcome as a given. The current financial crisis may force the next government to address 
long-held inconsistencies in policy which undermine the pathway to a more sustainable 
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future for transportation. The next sections set out some proposals for change which are 
consistent with meeting the policy pressures which have been identified.
4. Response – Policies to Stop
4.1 Vehicle Scrappage Schemes 
The vehicle scrappage scheme (managed by BERR not DfT) is a £400M scheme announced 
in response to the drastic fall in new car sales in 2009. People trading in a vehicle over 10 
years old receive a £1000 subsidy from government which is matched by the manufacturers 
(although the extent to which this is additional to rather than a substitute for other offers 
remains debatable). The SMMT’s figures suggest that, to September 2009, 200000 existing 
or banked orders had been placed. 70% of purchases have been brought forward and are 
therefore “new sales”. This does however mean that £60m has been spent on subsidising 
purchases that would in any case have happened. They estimate that, as a result of 
consumers purchasing lower emitting vehicles a total lifecycle saving of 2.7MTonnes CO2
will be made. A rough calculation suggests that this is at a cost of around £75 per tonne of 
carbon compared with the 2007 shadow price of £25/tonne. This is not a cost-effective policy 
and this should come as no surprise.
An evaluation of scrappage schemes by the World Energy Council (available before the 
scheme was introduced) concludes that cash-for-replacement schemes are not very cost 
effective, particularly compared with cash for scrapping (WEC, 2008). By constraining 
consumers to purchase a new car they exclude “lower-income groups who cannot afford to 
purchase new cars even with an incentive bonus. This makes the schemes somewhat 
inequitable, but more importantly, prevents them from attracting many of the oldest cars in 
the fleet, used typically by lower-income families intensively, as their principal means of 
transport. These schemes, therefore, have not properly selected the vehicles to be retired, 
leaving in use a large proportion of the 'gross emitters'. Moreover, higher payments are 
necessary to influence the decision to purchase a new car, rather than simply scrapping a 
car (which might be replaced with a used car or not replaced at all)….they do not compare 
favourably with other alternative policy tools on purely environmental grounds.” (Chapter 
3.7).  Whilst this policy may, on the surface, be consistent with the carbon reduction agenda 
of DASTS, it is bad value for money and not an equitable policy. It should be stopped.
4.2 High Speed Rail
Preston (2009) concludes that in any assessment of a new HSR line or network in the UK, 
the dominant benefits are time savings to HSR users and the net revenue to the rail industry. 
Although strongly marketed as an environmentally preferable option to expanding air travel, 
the environmental benefits are marginal and are highly dependent on assumptions made 
about embedded emissions, the carbon intensity of the grid, mode switching and what will 
happen with the existing rail network. Preston concludes that whilst a scheme would be 
operationally profitable it would require public support of between £17Bn and £27Bn. The 
Benefit:Cost ratios of all but the most expansive of network options also appear marginal 
(typically around 1.5) and certainly below those which the DfT suggest schemes require for 
consideration. Eddington was strongly against the notion of large proposals of this nature 
when many more proposals of much greater benefit could be delivered.
We also note that HSR will tend to encourage people to travel over longer distances more 
often and will thus serve to both induce travel demand and encourage the dispersion of 
activities over time and space.  Low income populations have the least to benefit and the 
most to lose from this, in that they usually cannot afford to participate in the journey time 
saving benefits due to the high cost of fares and/or the incompatible routing of such services 
in relation to their journey needs.  They are also least able to adapt their own behaviours to 
meet the escalating need to travel just to maintain a basic lifestyle that is generated by the 
use of ever faster modes.  In addition, high speed travel tends to erode the commercial 
viability of slower modes leaving them vulnerable and reliant on subsidies, as we have seen 
with the bus industry. It appears that the main arguments for HSR are economic – yet even 
these appear weak or uncertain. Other actions could generate a better return with greater 
environmental and equity benefits and, particularly given the vast capital investment required 
HSR proposals should be shelved.
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4.3 Hard Shoulder Running
The Highways Agency (HA) with responsibility for the motorway network has a remit to 
improve journey times, journey time reliability and motorway safety. In September 2006 it 
piloted an Active Traffic Management scheme on the M42 which centred upon the 
application of hard shoulder running (HaShR). The scheme tackles recurrent congestion but 
also event-based (unanticipated) congestion. The HA (2007) and in turn The Transport 
Secretary hailed the pilot a success with a subsequent announcement that it would be 
extended to other parts of the network (GNN, 2007). While HaShR may in the short term be 
an effective means of managing traffic it could in the longer term have the unintended and 
undesirable effect of encouraging traffic growth and emissions – in short, good traffic 
management may equal bad demand management. What lessons can be learnt from the 
Netherlands where HaShR is already applied? (if attempts have been made there to 
examine the extent of consequences) (RoSPA, 2004). Does HaShR generate more car 
traffic? Does it abstract existing traffic from other routes? Does it abstract demand from other 
modes? These are surely key questions to be asked alongside addressing the operational 
and driving behaviour issues associated with implementation. 
The DfT has considered HaShR in its NTM production of road transport forecasts (DfT, 
2008a) in examining the scenario of HaShR equivalent to (and in place of) planned 
motorway widening. There appears some acknowledgement of the potential for HaShR (as 
with new infrastructure capacity) to generate some new traffic – “even when [HaShR is] on, 
congestion eventually begins to rise again as flow increases to utilise the additional road 
space” (DfT, 2008b). While we recognise that HaShR as currently envisaged is not 
equivalent to ‘large scale road building on the cheap’ we suggest there is a serious concern 
that its apparent cost-effectiveness will lead to an expansion of its application that would 
then become the equivalent to a substantial road building programme (‘HaShR to Prosperity’ 
perhaps as opposed to Thatcher’s ‘Roads to Prosperity’). There is a remarkable lack of 
debate about the long-run implications of widespread HaShR from a demand management 
perspective and this apparent failure to explore and discuss the potential unintended and 
second-order effects of this policy is the principal reason why we propose that the policy 
should be stopped (or at the very least delayed).
4.4 Free Concessionary Fares for >60s
The decision to offer free travel to all over 60s was, it appears, not a policy which emerged 
from the Department for Transport but the Treasury. As a devolved policy it is worth noting 
that England followed after Scotland and Wales in adopting this policy. The total cost of 
concessionary fares rocketed from £487m to £712m in England alone between 2005/06 and 
2006/07 when the scheme was introduced within local authority boundaries (funded through 
DCLG grants). The Department for Transport has subsequently had to make available an 
additional £212m to allow for the additional costs of making the concession eligible for travel 
across local boundaries in a nationwide scheme.
If the purpose of the subsidy is to improve the well-being of older people then it is poorly 
targeted. First, the concession is available to all older people whether or not they have 
access to a bus service and whether or not they have the capability and confidence to use it. 
Secondly, it is far from clear that fares per se are the number one concern regarding older 
people and bus travel. Increased frequency of service is more important than fares 
reductions as are issues such as driver behaviour (Marsden et al., 2009). There is a 
separate larger question as to whether the subsidy should focus on the older traveller at all 
(given the pre-existence of a 50% concession). Such a subsidy, targeted at those seeking 
employment or children in low income families would arguably deliver more for the equality 
and inclusion agenda. In the severely restricted financial climate we are entering such 
examples of poorly targeted subsidy must be removed. Whilst such a move would be 
politically difficult in times of growth, the current climate arguably provides an opportunity to 
take this decision and determine an appropriate replacement.
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4.5 The separate classification of Commercial and Industrial (C&I) waste from household 
municipal waste 
DEFRA’s ‘England Waste Strategy’ (2007) highlighted the need for reducing the amount of 
waste generated by the commercial and industrial sectors which currently stands at about 68 
million tonnes per annum (24% of the annual waste arisings in England). 
. 
Under Section 34 of the 1990 Environmental Protection Act, commercial premises have a 
‘duty of care’ to make satisfactory arrangements for their waste collection (Defra, 1990) and 
many different private contractors can provide this service (e.g. Maynard and Cherrett (2009) 
found that 19 separate organisations collected residual waste and recyclate from 76 
businesses on Winchester High Street. Whilst some of this waste (chemical, construction 
etc) is very different in composition from household waste arisings, a large proportion 
(between 64% and 74% in some cases, (McLeod et al., 2008) is similar (paper and 
cardboard) and could be mixed. The reason for separating commercial from household 
waste when a large proportion is compositionally similar is down solely to historical practice, 
and reforming the legal definition to integrate C&I waste into municipal waste could pave the 
way for more sustainable ‘co-ordinated’ collection practices (Coggins and McIlveen, 2009). 
Many small businesses (SMEs) currently find it difficult to find a local trade waste recycling 
service that meets their needs as the collection of SME trade waste for recycling is often not 
considered commercially viable by the larger waste contractors. DEFRA estimates that 
although 71% of SMEs currently undertake some form of recycling, 1.16 million are still not 
recycling any materials because of these reasons, and there is therefore a significant market 
opportunity to set up trade recycling services. Following the lead set by many of our 
European neighbours and re-classifying C&I waste in this way could allow local authorities to 
offer joint domestic-commercial collections which could have a significant impact in reducing 
waste collection vehicle activity in urban centres. This is one example of where regulatory 
reform could generate significant benefits with little or no investment. There must be others.
5. Response – Policies to Start
5.1 Distance Based Road-User Charging
Section 3 highlights the long-term fallibility of the current approach to taxing motoring 
through fuel duty and VED.  The limit will soon be reached where decisions taken to offset 
reductions in revenue brought about by a shift to low carbon by increasing fuel tax will be 
seen as acceptable. This is the medium-term impetus for a change in the way we pay to 
travel. We suggest the introduction of a distance based road user charging scheme which 
may have charges differentiated further by type of road and time of day. Until now 
implemented road user charging schemes have been somewhat limited both in terms of 
scale and scope, based either on specific locations or for specific types of vehicle, namely 
road haulage. Although previously considered in the UK (most recently DfT, 2004) this is not 
a Government policy and a number of European Countries are currently considering more 
ambitious road user charging schemes, most notably the Netherlands with a nationwide 
distanced-based scheme for all road users and Sweden, France and Belgium in relation to 
road haulage (Vonk Noordegraaf et al 2009). 
Clearly if such a radical scheme is to be introduced then there is the issue of public 
acceptance which can be addressed to a certain extent by being revenue neutral, at least in 
the first instance. This could involve the removal of VED and a reduction of fuel duty in 
subsequent years. Revenue neutrality is a key principal in the Dutch proposal. It is important 
first to establish such a scheme – which would be a major change in the way people pay for 
travel. Further complexities could be introduced at a later stage. We see, for example, the 
potential for local authorities to be allowed to introduce (within specified limits) additional 
local ‘time of day’ taxes for roads in their areas with revenues hypothecated for transport 
measures. For example, Devon and Cornwall could increase the charge during Fridays and 
Saturdays in the summer peak period. Such schemes are often criticised for reducing the 
link between car use and CO2 emissions and we feel this could be addressed by further tax 
reforms as set out in Section 8.2.
Clearly, practical issues relating to scheme design, cost, complexity, reliability, robustness of 
the technology, on-board or off-board charging, effectiveness and accuracy need to be 
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carefully considered. The Feasibility Study of Road Pricing in the UK (DfT 2004) identified 
the benefits quite clearly and asked why “aren’t more public authorities around the world 
implementing road pricing…?” The simple answer is that it involves change. As such, there 
is a need for information, transparency, and education and the rationale for motoring taxes in 
this country has for a long time been murky (HoC, 2009).  Reform of the system of paying for 
motoring will be necessary – it is time for these issues to be addressed.
5.2 Personal Carbon Allowances
If emissions from personal air travel (excluding business journeys) are added to domestic 
emissions, 51% of the UK’s carbon equivalent emissions are the direct responsibility of 
individual consumption (HM Government 2009b). A radically different approach to demand 
reduction which provides a framework for reducing demand for all mobility and energy 
services, as well as for increased energy efficiency and the carbon intensity of fuels - is the 
concept of personal carbon allowances/trading (PCAs). The idea of an overall cap on 
emissions that is progressively brought down in line with targets could convert national 
carbon reduction aspirations into reality in a way that is equitable, ensuring that every citizen 
plays their part. However, this does assume that governments would be prepared to allow 
prices to rise to very high levels if this were needed to maintain the cap.
PCAs could take many different formats, starting first with just vehicle fuels and scaling up to 
include individual purchases of goods and services with parallel schemes capping and 
reducing emissions from the other half of the economy. The current government has 
concluded that compared with an upstream trading scheme covering the relevant sectors, 
PCTs would be an expensive way of achieving a relatively modest additional reduction. This 
is primarily due to the administrative costs of setting up and running a scheme. Such findings 
are however contested (e.g. Bird and Lockwood 2009). In addition to taking an integrated 
approach to energy use and mobility services, a main additional effect of a PCA scheme 
above and beyond a pure price signal is arguably the increased visibility of emissions
leading to a wider range of effects including greater price visibility and higher motivation to 
reduce emissions (Bird and Lockwood 2009; Parag and Strickland 2009). One of the 
obstacles to feeling responsible for climate change is that it is so removed from individual 
experience (Anable et al. 2006). However, there is insufficient evidence to estimate the scale
of this additional effect.
Arguments also exist around the equity impacts of PCAs. There exists clear potential for 
equity benefits as the scheme would reward those who used energy wisely and penalise 
those who didn't. A system that allowed those who rarely drive and fly to sell their quota to 
higher users and flyers would be massively redistributive. As with our current benefit system, 
those with particular need could be compensated using the cash generated from selling the 
other half of credits to industry. This is both equitable and fair, and would encourage the 
wider use of energy efficiency measures and innovation in green technologies. The 
operational complexity of such schemes may though prove to be a barrier and such 
schemes should not be seen as seeking to correct all of the distributional issues which are 
faced in society. Given the potential for such a scheme to align behaviour and prices we 
believe it is too early to be dismissed from the policy mix. Its adoption would however 
radically alter the other proposals we make on environmental taxes.
5.3 Treating the telecommunications infrastructure as part of transport policy’s responsibility
A cornerstone of established transport planning is that travel is a derived demand. It is 
derived from the need or desire to participate in activities. Travel dictates individual and 
organisational accessibility - affording access to people, goods, services and opportunities. 
Such access fuels economic activity. There has been an evidently strong link between traffic 
growth and economic growth. However, we would assert that the underlying coupling is in 
fact between accessibility growth and economic growth. The information age, we suggest, 
has contributed to the weakening the traffic intensity of economic growth because access is 
becoming less dependent on (motorised) mobility. It seems remarkable then that the 
Government’s consultation document on its future transport strategy (DfT, 2008b) centred 
attention on “identifying strategic use of the road network”, “identifying strategic use of the 
railways” and “identifying air services”. 
UTSG
January 2010
Plymouth MARSDEN et al.: Opportunities and Options
11
Conspicuous by its absence in a 21st Century policy document was “identifying strategic use 
of the telecommunications network” (i.e. ICTs): should it not be DfT’s responsibility to 
address the transport of information as well as the transport of people and goods? Assuming 
this responsibility would resurrect the (long lost?) notion of integration. Commuting, business 
and shopping in 2008 accounted for 540 of the 992 trips per person on average: over half 
(54%) and 41% of distance travelled (DfT, 2009c). In all three cases information exchange is 
a significant element of the destination activities (and growing in the case of the first two in 
the knowledge economy) and ICTs are already playing a role in providing alternative means 
of engagement. Transport policy is currently inactive in relation to this: it needs at least to be 
reactive in working alongside market forces. Telecommuting, teleconferencing and 
teleshopping will never replace their physical travel counterparts but they can replace a 
proportion of travel if suitable policy measures are employed. Such ‘teleservices’ are in effect 
carrots: encouraging their uptake and then locking in the benefits like other carrot measures 
requires the accompaniment of sticks. For instance, we have for too long assumed public 
transport to be the bedfellow of road pricing when as well if not instead we should now be 
seeing teleservices as road pricing’s accompaniment.
5.4 Rationalising Waste Collection
Section 4.5 highlighted some of the barriers to more efficient recycling as a result of the 
classification of waste streams. There exists a wide range of actions which have been piloted 
and which, if adopted on a larger scale could reduce the number of goods vehicles 
accessing our town centres and reduce the mileage driven to dispose of recyclate. One 
example of good practice is New Forest District Council where commercial waste is collected 
as part of the domestic rounds from SMEs who have pre-registered with the council and 
have acquired a ‘duty of care’ certificate. Research looking at theoretical joint 
domestic/commercial collection rounds across Hart and Rushmoor suggested that a 
commercial waste load of 3.9 tonnes/fortnight could be readily accommodated on the 
existing alternate weekly collection domestic round, without increasing the number of trips 
required to the waste disposal site (McLeod and Cherrett, 2007). 
The Producer Pre-Treatment Requirement (Biffa, 2009) requires businesses to separate out 
the recyclate (e.g. cardboard, paper, plastic, glass, metal) from the residual waste stream at 
source, or send un-separated waste to either a sortation facility where recyclate can be 
recovered, or to send co-mingled waste to an ‘energy-from-waste’ facility (incinerator). 
Businesses could co-operate here too. In a drive to promote more sustainable logistics, 
could some of the larger retailers employing centralised distribution systems back-load 
(using spare space on the delivery vehicle) recyclate on behalf of their high street 
neighbours, particularly to help SMEs? Many of the larger High Street names utilise their 
delivery vehicles to back-load their own recyclate in this way, but to transport other 
businesses’ waste, a waste carrier’s licence would be required by the main logistics provider. 
This could be issued by the Local Authority free of charge as part of an incentive under a 
Freight Quality Partnership. Despite various other issues, (brand image, variability in peak 
volumes), the potential recyclate could make it financially attractive to major retailers as a 
back-loading option, and could reduce third-party waste collection vehicle activity in the retail 
centre. Other models include dropping materials at a recyclate ‘groupage’ point (e.g. a 
distribution centre) where the material could be consolidated before disposal. Local 
authorities would have to be the drivers of such ‘green logistics’ strategies, being prepared to 
stipulate that in certain areas, freight management (be it for core goods delivery or for 
service activity) will be undertaken in a particular way, similar to the ‘landlord-tenant’ 
relationship operating in many multi-retailer shopping centres. Maybe it is time to turn our 
attention to really getting the most out of our existing systems – apparently common sense 
initiatives such as these need to be driven forward.
6. Response – Policies to Do More of
6.1 A Sustained Investment in Smarter Choices
Investment in smarter choices remains a marginal activity in the UK. An assessment of local 
transport plans in 2007 indicated that only a quarter of transport authorities were making 
significant use of smarter choices in their plans (DfT 2007). The recent Carbon Reduction 
Strategy sparked debate over the Government’s commitment to smarter choices after it 
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appeared to suggest that research had overestimated their impact and more evidence is 
required before committing more investment (DfT 2009d; LTT 17/09/09). There are 
legitimate concerns over the quality of the evidence and issues of scaleability and the need 
to lock-in the benefits (Gross et al. 2009; Bonsall 2007; Cairns et al. 2004). These issues will 
be difficult to resolve where implementation is short term and piecemeal. Yet evidence from 
policy and practice leaves little doubt over the potential malleability of travel behaviour at the 
individual level, particularly when behaviour change is expanded beyond mode choice to 
include destination switching, car occupancy, route timing and even car choice. A systematic 
evidence review undertaken by the UK Energy Research Centre found remarkably 
consistent reported effects from a variety of measures in very different parts of the world with 
approximate car usage reductions of around 5-10%, greater reductions in VMT and 
significant increases in alternative modes (Gross et al. 2009). The point is that it is not simply 
about short run ‘mode-switching’ (replacing a car journey with a public transport journey or 
active mode) but that being informed about and having quality transport options affects the 
medium and longer term choices people make over where to live and work and other lifestyle 
choices. 
The question remains over what a sustained investment in smarter choices entails and at 
what level of investment? DfT have been trialling smarter choices in three sustainable travel 
towns (total population 350.000) at a cost of £10m (£3.3m each) over 5 years, plus an extra 
£5m spent on supporting capital schemes. This equates to a total spend of £45 per head of 
population in the towns across the five years. Provisional indications are that over this period 
car driver distance across all trips was reduced by 5%, with the biggest impact (a 7% 
distance reduction) on trips of up to 50 miles (Sloman et al, forthcoming). A longer term 
investment is likely to see a build up of effects at lower cost per kilometre saved, although 
potentially hitting a ceiling once the easier wins are reached (Cairns et al. 2004). The 
evidence is weak for the potential of smarter choices in rural areas. Implementation of 
smarter choices across urban areas in England (population ca. 40m) of the country at the 
same ‘intensity’ as the three sustainable travel towns would imply annual public spending of 
about £360m. Importantly, smarter choices require primarily revenue expenditure which, in 
the current fiscal context, may be hard to sustain without coupling them with complementary 
revenue raising measures or taking away from other transport budgets. However, Section 6 
has already highlighted over £300M annual revenue savings from reversing the shift to 100% 
concessionary fares.
6.2 Extend First Year VED rate to pay for low-carbon vehicle subsidies
A long-term programme is scheduled to commence in 2011 with a budget of £250m to 
provide subsidies of between £2000 and £5000 per vehicle for ultra-low carbon vehicles to 
offset the significant short-term additional costs of their purchase. A budget of £30m is also 
available for low carbon buses. The argument here is that these subsidies will stimulate the 
uptake of these technologies in the UK and will put UK manufacturing at the forefront of this 
potentially important market.  
The ultra-low carbon vehicle purchase subsidy is a more strategic initiative than the 
scrappage scheme which we have suggested is stopped. Some form of incentives will be 
required to overcome the cost barriers to early adoption and ultimately bring down the unit 
purchase cost of these vehicles. It is unlikely that such large subsidies would provide a 
positive benefit:cost ratio but there may be a case that the short-term losses will be 
outweighed by the longer-term gains. Of course, an equally viable policy that countries 
without a vehicle manufacturing base might propose is to free-ride the technological 
development costs and adopt slightly later. It appears that the UK government has 
eschewed this policy in favour of the arguments of developing a ‘green economy’. This is a 
debate to which politics has as much to say as academic research. 
However, even if it is accepted that low carbon vehicles should be subsidised there is a 
range of means by which this could be done. Should the government be subsidising vehicle 
purchases? The UK has traditionally only applied VAT to vehicle purchases whereas many 
other governments include a purchase tax. A more equitable and logical solution would be to 
adopt a scheme similar in nature to the French ‘bonus-malus’ scheme whereby cars with 
CO2 emissions less than 130g/km (progressively reducing over time) receive a €200 one-
time bonus whilst those over 160g/km pay on a sliding scale from €200 to €2,600 for cars 
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with emissions higher than 250 g/km. The aim of such a scheme is zero net revenue. Such a 
measure would appear to fulfil environmental objectives, avoid conflicting with congestion 
objectives, not cause undue distributional impacts as well as reducing the direct subsidy 
from government. The decision of the UK government to introduce higher first year rates of 
VED for new cars emitting over 130g/km would suggest that an extended scheme would be 
feasible and in the direction of travel of current thinking – it should be adopted.
6.3 Workplace Parking Levy
“Employees driving to work and enjoying free parking at the workplace account for a 
significant proportion of peak hour congestion…Local authorities determine the price and 
availability of public parking, on and off the highway. But they have little control over existing 
parking spaces at private business premises” (DETR, 1998). As such, the view was that 
additional powers were required in order to address the issue of workplace parking and in 
2000 Local Authorities were given the power, by the Transport Bill, to introduce a workplace 
parking levy (WPL). If Local Authorities introduced such a scheme then owners or occupiers 
of business premises would have to apply for a licence so as to allow a certain number of 
vehicles to park on site. The aim of the WPL would be to provide an incentive for occupiers 
of premises to reduce the total number of parking spaces available, thus restricting the 
number of vehicles for which a licence is required. It also serves to partially correct the 
untaxed perk of free city centre parking (which is simply waived by anyone choosing to 
commute by more sustainable modes).
Nottingham City Council is the only local authority to propose and have approved a WPL. It 
has set the aim of the WPL as one of constraining congestion and providing funding in order 
to improve public transport, most notably the extension of the City’s tram network. The 
Nottingham WPL is due to start in 2012 with a phased implementation charge of £253 per 
space, per annum. The scheme will only apply to employers with more than 10 spaces (500 
employers will have to pay whilst 3000 smaller businesses will be exempt). It is expected 
that 50% of employers will pass on the charge to their employees and there may be an 
overall reduction in parking spaces of 10% (Nottingham City Council, 2008)
Like any new policy measure the WPL is not without difficulties. For example, the WPL is 
seen as something of a blunt instrument for dealing with congestion since it is not able to 
distinguish between journeys undertaken on congested roads within congested periods with 
those that are not. In addition it does not account for the fact that some motorists will have 
viable public transport alternatives while others will not. The impacts on streets around 
charged premises and the wider impacts on business are unknown. Much will depend on the 
perceived advantages of the new public transport provision that such a scheme can fund. In 
the current economic climate WPL may be one of the few relatively quick and cheap 
measures available to authorities to support major public transport scheme development. 
Whilst not perfect, it does at least correct a hidden subsidy to some car commuters and offer 
some incentive to promote alternatives to car travel to avoid the levy by reducing the 
required numbers of parking spaces.
6.4 Speed Enforcement
Driven speeds on motorways and dual carriageways in Great Britain are well above the 
optimum for fuel efficiency, with 49% of cars exceeding the 70mph limit on motorways and 
15% travelling above 80mph (DfT 2009e). This level of non-compliance is testimony to the 
relatively relaxed policy enforcement and social permissions surrounding motorway speeding 
as well as its facilitation by vehicles more efficient and comfortable to drive at speed. Yet, 
this demand for more speed, power and comfort has eroded some of the efficiency gains 
that would on their own have led to more rapid reduction in emissions per kilometre (Sorrell 
and Dimitropoulos, 2007). 
A simple law of physics dictates that fuel efficiency falls significantly as speed increases. 
This relationship is unlikely to be mitigated to any great extent by improved vehicle design. A 
medium sized diesel car will emit up to 14% more CO2 per kilometre at 80 mph compared to 
70 mph (NAEI, 2003). Yet, in their low carbon strategy, the DfT relegated strict speed 
enforcement to ‘policies considered but not adopted’, presenting a large negative NPV due 
to pessimistic assumptions about compliance, cost and the cumulative order in which carbon 
savings emerge from policies in their strategy (DfT 2009d). However, later in the year, the 
Climate Change Committee adopted it in their core scenario, calculating that strict 
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enforcement on 70 mph roads would save 1.4MtCO2 in 2020 (that is 4% of savings 
expected from all transport policies) (CCC 2009). Moreover, these savings can happen early 
in the budget period and are therefore worth more over the longer term.
Time losses due to slower speeds are an important policy preoccupation (off-peak at least!). 
However, the time-elasticity of demand means speed enforcement is simultaneously a 
demand management and an efficiency measure. It affects journey time, traffic flow and 
potentially has a longer term impact on the demand for faster, more powerful vehicles. As is 
a common failure of carbon calculations, particularly of demand side policies, these 
secondary impacts are not included in calculations of potential carbon savings. Hence, 
speed enforcement could amplify the benefits of many of the changes that are being 
proposed to curb emissions as well as having the locking-in role already outlined. This is all 
in addition to substantial safety benefits. A more radical option would be to mandate the 
introduction of Intelligent Speed Adaptation technology which provide real time advice to the 
driver or physically restrict vehicle speeds (Carsten et al. 2008).
Enforcing speed limits, while doing no more than ensuring road users obey the law, is in 
practice a contentious political issue and is a test case for public engagement and 
communicating trade-offs and policy packages to the public. Faced with a choice between 
this and more restrictive policies, speed enforcement may experience renewed popularity. 
Unlike many other transport demand restraint mechanisms, lowering speed limits would be 
one of the fairest ways of reducing emissions as it applies to all of the people all of the time, 
regardless of income or geography.
9. Conclusions
Transport policy has never been more challenging or more challenged. ‘Predict and provide’
has been eschewed. The alternative policy path of accepting broadly similar levels of growth 
but managing the impacts through more intensive use of the assets and a light touch 
approach to demand management, has not put the UK on a path to a more sustainable 
transport system. This is in spite of some notable successes and record levels of investment.
The future is characterised by a significant reduction in public sector support for transport. 
This must surely be the klaxon for a change in policy. If 10 years of record investment did not 
achieve the change that was promised then what odds 10 years of reduced investment will? 
This provides an opportunity to reposition the debate and to re-examine the basis upon 
which the debate is held. This paper concludes that the next government needs to re-
examine the recent trends in traffic growth and the stability of the driving forces. It also needs 
to develop policy scenarios that are capable of meeting the simultaneous driving forces of 
climate change, obesity and economic recovery.
To meet these demands requires transport policy makers to focus on those policies which 
bring the most benefits at least cost, to withdraw comfortable but unjustifiable and 
sometimes inequitable subsidies and to look to remove the many inefficiencies in the way we 
travel and move goods. This paper presents a short analysis of 14 such policies - our 
attempt to begin this debate. We set out why we think policies such as High Speed Rail, 
100% concessionary fares and vehicle scrappage subsidy should be stopped and why there 
is a case for more widespread use of smarter choices and speed enforcement on 
motorways. In thinking about the “new” policies that should be adopted we noticed at least 
one elephant in the room. There still seems to be a reluctance to consider 
telecommunications as a means of travel for example. Equally crucial is the need to think 
about what might replace fuel duty beyond 2020 when the switch to a more mixed fleet of 
petrol, electric, hybrid and biomass fuelled vehicles will place the current way we pay for 
travel under significant strain. A national road user charging scheme or the adoption of 
personal carbon trading are two options we consider. 
There are undoubtedly some difficult choices ahead but we must avoid the ‘easy choice’ of a 
cut-price business as usual approach. We hope that this paper sparks a lively and on-going 
debate within UTSG and beyond on alternative policy options for the future. 
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